We give an interpretation of the Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) Principle in gametheoretic terms. Based on this interpretation, we m a k e a formal distinction between di erent w ays of applying Maximum Entropy d i stributions. MaxEnt has frequently been criticized on the grounds that it leads to highly representation dependent results. Our distinction allows us to avoid this problem in many cases.
INTRODUCTION
The Maximum Entropy Principle (Jaynes, 1989 ) is an often successful yet controversial method for inductive inference. It has been justi ed and criticized in many di erent ways (Jaynes, 1989 Grove et al., 1994 Halpern & Koller, 1995 . Here we g i v e a n o vel game-theoretic justi cation that is fundamentally different from previous ones: we show that the MaxEnt distribution for a given constraint is the distribution that minimizes the worst-case expected loss when used for prediction in a certain game. We give several interpretations of this game. We argue that the game-theoretic interpretation is more natural than the usual one, and that it sheds new light on the circumstances in which MaxEnt can be fruitfully applied. Speci cally, there are applications of MaxEnt where the same inference problem may be associated with Also:
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several di erent games with di erent w orst-case optimal strategies. We use this insight to formally distinguish between qualitatively di erent w ays of applying a M a x E n t distribution, ranging from`completely safe' to`completely untrustworthy' applications. This also leads to a partial solution of Bertrand's paradox, i.e. the representation dependency of MaxEnt inferences. Sections 2-4 introduce notation and review MaxEnt and the representation dependency problem. Section 5 gives our game-theoretic reinterpretation. Sections 6-8 show h o w t h e reinterpretation can be used to distinguish between di erent w ays of applying MaxEnt and to (sometimes) avoid Bertrand's paradox.
PRELIMINARIES
Consider a nite sample space . We reserve the use of random variable X to denote outcomes in . All other random variables can be vector valued, i.e. they are by de nition functions from to R k for some k > 0. For random variable Y : ! R k , w e de ne the range of Y , denoted by Y , a s Y = fy 2 R k j 9 x 2 : Y (x) = yg: By this notation X = . We let P Y stand for the family of all probability distributions over Y .
For a P Y 2 P Y and A Y Y , P Y (A Y ) denotes the probability mass of A Y under P Y . For distributions P X 2 P X , the notation P X (Y = y) is short for P X (fx 2 X j Y (x) = yg). Let P Y 2 P Y and P Z 2 P Z be distributions over Y and Z respectively. We say t h a t P Y and P Z are compatible (with underlying space X ) if there exists a P X 2 P X such that for all y 2 Y P X (Y = y) = P Y (fyg) and for all z 2 Z P X (Z = z) = P Z (fzg). Intuitively, P Y and P Z are compatible if they can be thought of as marginal distributions of a single distribution P X dened over the more ne-grained space X . We frequently use random variables that are indicator func- We n o w ask the following question: if the only knowledge we have about P are the constraints given by (1), what is then our`best' guess for P ? (for interpretations of`best' see Section 6). According to the adherents of maximum entropy we should adopt the distribution P that, among all the distributions satisfying the constraints (1), maximizes the entropy H M (P ). To formalize this idea we rst abbreviate the constraints (1) to
Here (X) = ( 1 (X) : : : k (X)) T is a function from X to R k and t is a k-dimensional vector (t 1 : : : t k ) T .
Each constraint of form (2) determines a set of probability distributions satisfying the constraint. This set is denoted by C: C := fP 2 P X j E P (X)] = tg:
In all our theorems and propositions, we w i l l a s s u m e the following Regularity conditions (A) X is nite (B) the set C mentioned in the theorems is de ned as in (3) and is non-empty (this means that every conceivable and t are allowed as long as C is non-empty).
We can now de ne maximum entropy inference for- (4) Our regularity conditions are su cient t o e n s u r e t h a t a unique P me M always exists.
MAXENT, MEASURE AND REPRESENTATION DEPENDENCY
Several versions of MaxEnt and of the related minimum relative e n tropy principles exist in the literature.
By making the entropy H M dependent o n a n u n d e r l ying measure M, w e can account for all of these with our Equation 4. We distinguish between two main forms:
Case A: M NOT available (U-MaxEnt) This is the`classical' form of MaxEnt for discrete sample spaces (Jaynes, 1989) . It does not mention any underlying measure and tells us to pick the distribution P 2 C maximizing E P ; ln P(X)]. It can be implemented in (4) by taking M to be the uniform measure over the sample space X , de ned by M(x) 1. We will refer to this form of MaxEnt a s U-MaxEnt.
Case B: M available We will refer to this case simply as`MaxEnt'. It has two sub-cases: rst, the case where a unique measure (`natural way o f c o u n ting outcomes') is available a priori. Sometimes, through knowledge of the physics of the domain that is being modeled, one can decide on a unique underlying measure M that is appropriate for the domain at hand (for ways to determine such a measure, see (Jaynes, 1989) ). (4) can be directly applied here. Second, the Minimum Relative Entropy Principle. This is the case where a prior probability Q over X is known, and the goal is to`update' this prior probability based on the constraint (2). The minimum relative entropy principle tells us to pick t h e P minimizing E P ln(P (X)=Q(X))]. By picking M = Q, this can be represented as maximizing entropy relative t o M.
If a priori knowledge about the domain other than the given constraint (2) is completely lacking, then U-MaxEnt (case A) is the only form we can apply.
Unfortunately, case A is also the most problematic by far. In contrast to case B, case A typically gives results that are highly representation dependent: if the same domain is represented in a di erent language, MaxEnt m a y lead to di erent results. Since the choice of representation seems arbitrary, the results one obtains using U-MaxEnt seem arbitrary as well. This fact is { at least in the case of continuous data { often referred to as Bertrand's Paradox.
Example 1 (a simple Bertrand's Paradox) Let X = f1 2 3g and let there be no further constraints (in our formulation, this can be expressed by picking (x) 0 and constraint E P (X) ] = 0 ) . Consider an agent (call him Mr. X) who wants to infer a distribution over X and who uses U-MaxEnt. Hence he picks P me UX as given by (4) (Halpern & Koller, 1995) . In our formulation (with underlying measure), Bertrand's paradox can be equivalently expressed as the dependency Y has the same e ect on the probability assignments to elements of Y as the representation change from Y (with measure U Y ) to the more ne-grained X (with measure U X ). This observation will be made precise in Theorem 2, Section 7. Important In many cases, physical background knowledge provides a`natural' space for representing the domain at hand. For example, if we are to investigate the probabilities of the faces of a (possibly loaded) die, then by symmetry considerations, we should not distinguish a priori between the six faces. It is then only natural to take as basic sample space the space with exactly one outcome for each face, and to take a uniform measure over this space. The representation dependency should be considered problematic only if there is no preferred`natural' sample space or (equivalently, by Theorem 2), no natural underlying measure/prior. Some people do not see the above example as problematic: the two a g e n ts are facing di erent`experimental situations', so it is not so strange that they obtain di erent results. But then the question is: what exactly constitutes an`experimental situation' ?It is this question we will partially answer through our gametheoretic reinterpretation of MaxEnt, which we proceed to discuss.
MAXENT AS A GAME
The information inequality (Cover & Thomas, 1991) tells us that for all distributions P and Q over X , E P ; ln P(X)] E P ; ln Q(X)] (5) with equality i P = Q. This implies inf Q2PX E P ; ln(Q(X)=M(X))] = E P ; ln(P (X)=M(X))] and hence entropy c a n b e c haracterized as: H M (P ) = inf Q2PX E P ; ln(Q(X)=M(X))]. The maximum attainable entropy for distributions in a set C is therefore given by (6) Readers familiar with game theory (see e.g. (Berger, 1985) ) will recognize (6) as the maximin gain of a twoplayer zero-sum game. If they are acquainted with Von Neumann's minimax theorem, they may further suspect that the following equality holds:
This equality indeed holds under very mild conditions, although this does not follow directly from Von Neumann or Nash's theorems (which cannot handle arbi- E P ; ln P(X)
M is an`equalizer strategy', i.e. for all P 2 C , E P ; ln P me
A similar theorem with much less conditions on X and C will be provided in (Gr unwald & Dawid, 2000) .
Basic Interpretation Consider the decisiontheoretic setting where an Agent has to make decisions about the outcomes in some space X . Agent's decisions come from a decision space D and the loss is measured by some function loss : X D!R f 1 g . After making a decision 2 D, the actual outcome x 2 X is revealed and Agent incurs a loss loss(x ).
Sometimes the decisions are best interpreted as predictions of the values of x, sometimes they are best interpreted as game playing strategies. The logarithmic loss function is a loss function that occurs in several games with several interpretations (Berger, 1985 Cover & Thomas, 1991 . The set D of available decisions for these games consists of all functions P : X ! 0 1] such t h a t P x2 X P(x) = 1 .
Hence D is formally equivalent t o P X . However, as we will see, the elements of D sometimes have i n terpretations very di erent from probability distributions. The logarithmic loss function (relative to measure M) i s d ened by loss(x P) = ; ln(P (x)=M(x)) for each x 2 X and P 2 D . Consider now a game where Nature chooses a`true' distribution P and Agent wants to minimize his expected logarithmic loss. If Agent k n e w P , he would choose arg min P2PX E P loss(X P)].
By the information inequality (5) we see that this is given by P = P . But now consider the case where Agent only knows that P 2 C for some set C. He may now want to minimize his worst-case (maximal) expected l o garithmic loss over all choices of Nature. This is exactly what is expressed by (8): the maximum entropy distribution is the worst-case optimal distribution for predicting outcomes of X when loss is measured by the logarithmic loss function.
Why would Agent at all be interested in minimizing logarithmic loss? This game has several important i nterpretations. Below w e discuss one that is of speci c interest in the remainder of this paper others are summarized in Section 5.2.
KELLY GAMBLING INTERPRETATION
Imagine a lottery where there are tickets for sale for betting on outcomes in X = f1 : : : m g. Ticket j
(for 1 j m) pays b units if outcome j actually occurs otherwise, it pays nothing. All tickets cost 1 unit, so all outcomes share the same odds. Agent has some capital K which he wants to invest in lottery tickets. Suppose that Agent thinks that the actual outcomes are distributed according to some distribution P . Agent's gambling strategy can be described by a vector P = ( P(1) : : : P (m)) where P(j) i s t h e fraction of capital K that Agent invests in outcome j. That is, he buys P(j) K tickets for outcome j for convenience we allow buying a non-integer amount of tickets. If Agent plays the game only once, then his expected gain E P bKP(X)] is maximized by t h e strategy with P(j) = 1 for the j with maximum probability P (j). But now suppose Agent plays the same game several times. After each round, he reinvests his remaining capital by buying tickets for the next round.
So after round 1, his capital is K 1 = P(x 1 )bK where x 1 is the actual outcome at round 1. After round 2, his capital is K 2 = P(x 2 )bK 1 etc. If the number of rounds n is not too small or if it is not known in advance how many rounds there will be, it becomes better for Agent to adopt a fundamentally di erent strategy, sometimes called proportional gambling or the Kelly gambling scheme (Cover & Thomas, 1991, Chapter 7) . This is de ned as the gambling strategy P maximizing E P ln P(X)]. This quantity may be interpreted as the expected g r owth rate of the invested capital. To see why this is a sensible strategy, let P and Q betwo distributions such that E P ln P(X)] > E P ln Q(X)]. Suppose the game is played n times, and outcomes X 1 : : : X n are all independently distributed P . Then, by the strong law of large numbers, (1=n)
P n i=1 ln Q(X i ) ! E P ln Q(X)] with probability 1. It follows that there exists an > 0 s u c h that with probability 1, for all large n, (10) with P -probability 1 , for all n larger than some n 0 . If Agent uses strategy P at each round i, his capital after n rounds is given by K b n Q n i=1 P(x i ). Together with (10) this implies that for any t wo strategies P and Q, with P probability 1, Agent's end capital is exponentially larger for the strategy with larger expected growth rate. So (at least if n is large or unknown) a rational Agent should adopt the strategy P maximizing E P ln P(X)]. If the only thing Agent knows about P is that P 2 C, it is a good idea for the Agent to maximize his worst-case expected growth rate, i . e . to pick the strategy P that maximizes min P 2C E P ln P(X)], which is identical to the distribution minimizing max P 2C E P ; ln P(X)]. The latter distribution is the MaxEnt distribution with uniform measure M: P me M is the worst-case optimal distribution in the Kelly gambling game, maximizing, with probability 1, the worst-case end-capital for all large n. A uniform underlying measure M corresponds to the game with equal odds for all outcomes non-uniform measures correspond to games with non-uniform odds.
MDL & OTHER INTERPRETATIONS
The minimax game (8) has several other interpretations. We mention two. First, there is a statistical interpretation: many statistical inference procedures can beinterpreted as trying to infer, for a given set of data, the probability model within some class of models M that is`as close as possible' to the unknown,`true' data generating distribution P . In Maximum Likelihood and some Bayesian inference procedures,`closeness' is measured by means of the Kullback-Leibler KLdistance, which, for xed P and M, only di ers from the expected logarithmic loss E P ; ln(P (X)=M(X))] by a constant. Second, there is an interpretation in terms of the Minimum Description Length (MDL) Principle (Gr unwald, 1998), a method for inductive i nference that is based on data compression. MDL can be seen as a mathematical formalization of Occam's Razor. It turns out that based on the minimax formulation (8), MaxEnt c a n b e i n terpreted as a form of MDL this is shown in (Gr unwald, 1998) . Finally, w e note that even if we do not assume the existence of a unique true distribution P (to which for example the Bayesians may object) a form of our analysis can still be performed. All this will be treated in detail in the journal version of this paper.
THE GLASSES YOU ARE LOOKING THROUGH
Let us now stand back a n d a s k w h y A g e n t w ould like to infer a probability distribution ove r a d o m a i n i n t h e rst place. Usually, this is because he would like to make good or at least reasonable predictions or decisions concerning some random variable Y referring to the domain (more general prediction tasks will be con- knew the`true' distribution P governing domain X , then he could use this knowledge to make optimal predictions for any given loss function by predicting using the action^ = arg min 2D E P loss(Y )] (Berger, 1985) .
But the interpretation of P me M from the minimax point of view (8) suggests that P me M should rst and foremost be interpreted as the strategy to adopt in the game described in Section 5 and not as the distribution P according to which data are distributed. This leads to a k ey insight: perhaps we should not regard P me M as a guess of the`true' P to be used by Agent in every prediction task that can be de ned over the domain. It may be better to think of P me M as being wrong yet useful in that it may be a reasonable guess of P for use in some possible prediction tasks (i.e. for some random variables and loss functions) but a quite unreasonable guess for use in other combinations of random variables and loss functions 1 . To make this idea concrete, suppose Agent has no access to P but approximates it using P me M . For given loss function loss, A g e n t c a n u s e P me M to arrive at a prediction by picking^ = arg min
In general, this will lead to reasonable results if 8 2 D : E P me M loss(Y )] E P loss(Y )]. For each 2 D, the function de ned by (x) : = loss(Y (x) ) i s a random variable. Hence, in order to be able to decide for arbitrary loss function loss whether P me M as used in (11) will lead to reasonable predictions, it su ces if for arbitrary random variables : X ! R k , w e c a n decide whether E P me M (X)] is a reasonable guess for E P (X)]. Let us analyze this question further. In order to predict the likely value of E P (X)], Agent must assign probabilities to the values in that random variable takes. This involves`looking at the domain' in terms of the function in other words, determines the`glasses' through which Agent looks at data X from sample space X . But when inferring P me M , A g e n t observes averages of values of the function . Hence Agent looks at the world in terms of . As discussed in Section 5.1, P me M maximizes the worst-case gain when used for Kelly Gambling on the outcomes in X against odds determined by M.
We may now ask ourselves why Agent should be interested in a distribution that maximizes gain when betting on outcomes in X if both the observables ( (X)) and the`predictables' ( (X)) are outcomes in spaces di erent from X . If no a priori measure M is available, U-MaxEnt a d v ocates a uniform M. But should Agent adopt a uniform M over X , or ? Indeed , and X may be related in such a w ay that the optimal gambling strategies against uniform odds for outcomes in X and are mutually incompatible. This immediately suggests that postulating a uniform measure over X may not be the right thing to do and that it is not so strange that it leads to representation dependence. Analyzing this fact with the game-theoretic interpretation in mind, we n d ( i n Section 8.3) that if and are related in a certain way, w e can do something about this. Namely, as long as is at least as`coarse' as (`looking at an outcome x through the`glasses' allows a view on X 1 Related ideas are quite common in statistics and Machine Learning. As an example,`Naive B a yes' models are joint probability distributions de ned over discrete random variables X1 : : : X k Y of a certain parametric form. They usually perform exceedingly well when used t o p r edict values of Y conditional on X1 : : : X k (Friedman et al., 1997) under the 0=1 (classi cation) loss function. Yet they make all kinds of unwarranted independence assumptions that might lead to disastrous results if they were used to predict, say, the value of X2 conditional on the value of X1 . that is at least as ne-grained as the view through the glasses '), it is still possible to postulate an a priori measure M (not necessarily uniform over X ) such that the Kelly gambling games on outcomes in and and X against odds determined by M share the same worst-case optimal strategy P me M . Moreover, as we shall see, postulating M in this way makes P me M representation independent as long as it is only used for predictions concerning random variables that are at least as`coarse' as . Similarly, under stronger conditions on the relation between the functions and , one can guarantee not only that P me M is representation independent but even that E P me M ] = E P ], i.e. that the MaxEnt g u e s s o f E P ] is correct.
The moral of the story is that, depending on how t h è glasses' (ways of looking at the data) and are related, applying MaxEnt m a y ( a ) be inherently representation dependent (and should therefore not be used at all), or (b) be representation independent but not guaranteed to be`optimal' or`correct' (in this case it can be used as an inductive guess) or (c) be guaranteed to lead to correct or optimal predictions (in which case it should certainly be used). In Section 8 we formalize this distinction. We rst need to establish the relation between representations and underlying measures.
REPRESENTATION & MEASURE
In this section we will show t h a t i f w e stick t o a x e d measure, the results given by MaxEnt are invariant under all reasonable representation changes. We can think of an underlying space V as a space that is at least as or more ne-grained than Z . If V is a random variable X ! V , then this simply means that V determines Z. The notion is more general in that we c a n t a k e Z = X. In this case, V provides a new sample space such that all random variables that can be expressed as functions of X can also be expressed as functions of V . Let V be an underlying The following result is a simple extension of a wellknown theorem (see, for example (Shore & Johnson, 1980) ). It shows that, if a measure M X for the origi- The present game-theoretic view provides a novel and simple interpretation of this result. Roughly speaking, a representation change amounts to a change in the set of tickets one can buy in the Kelly gambling game (outcomes in W rather than X ) by adopting a measure (odds) over W that is compatible with the measure (odds) M X over X , one ensures that the prices of the di erent tickets will change along with the representation change so that the gambling game in the new space is essentially equivalent to the original game.
This implies that representation dependence of UMaxEnt stems only from the fact that, if we change representation from X to W , w e adopt mutually incompatible measures (namely, the uniform measures in both spaces). In fact, we can view each measure M X (as long as it is rational-valued) as an implicit rerepresentation of the problem to a di erent underlying space V in which M X (or, more precisely, the measure over V that is compatible with M X ) is uniform over V . We will use of this insight i n the next section, where we s h o w h o w to apply MaxEnt in a careful manner.
HOW TO APPLY MAXENT
In this section we return to our previous notation, i.e. In the case where we h a ve a de nite reason to pick X as our basic representation space (e.g. the case of throwing dice, see Example 1), we can take M := fU X g, where U X is the uniform measure over X . If no underlying measure can be determined at all, we will set M to be the class of all measures over X . As we will see, this will make M a x E n t unde ned in most cases. In order to make it well-de ned, we must rst guess a subset M 0 of M that case will be treated in Section 8.3.
We a r e n o w ready to present our hierarchy of di erent forms of applying MaxEnt. 4. ill-de ned otherwise.
We n o t e t h a t 1 : ) 2: ) 3. Category 2., while perhaps the most interesting, takes too long to discuss here. It will be explained in detail in the journal version of this paper. Category 4. concerns applications of Maximum Entropy that lead to arbitrary results and hence should be avoided (but see the next section!). By the discussion of the previous section, every (rationalvalued) 8.1 CONDITIONAL CORRECTNESS Let : X ! R and : X ! R k be two functions and let A X . We say that is an a ne function of over subdomain A if there exists ( 0 : : : k ) 2 R k+1 such that for all x 2 A (x) = 0 + P k i=1 i i (x). We de ne the support supp of P 0 X P X by supp(P 0 X ) : = fx 2 X j P(x) > 0 for some P 2 P 0 X g:
Theorem 3 If is an a ne function of over subdomain supp(C), then for all P 1 P 2 2 C , E P 1 (X)] = Let Z be a`trivial' random variable, i.e. 8x 2 X Z (x) = 1 . Theorem 1 implies that for any M 2 M and any C of form (3), P me M 2 C. Theorem 3 now gives that for arbitrary sets of measures M, applying MaxEnt to guess E P Y jZ] is conditionally correct i Y is an a ne function of over subdomain supp(C). To determine whether applying MaxEnt t o guess E P Y jZ] is conditionally correct for non-trivial Z (the case that Z(x) v aries over supp(C)), we i n terpret the conditioning event Z = z as the additional constraint E P 1 Z=z ] = 1 . Clearly, this constraint i s of the required form (2). Let, for z 2 Z , C (z) = C \ f P 2 P X j E P 1 Z=z ] = 1 g: (13) Then, by the same reasoning as above, applying Max- 
we can also directly infer that E P Y ] = 0 +
(the second equality follows because both P and P me M are members of C). However, there is at least one case where`correct' applications are not entirely trivial. From Theorem 1 we see that for all P 2 C, E P me M ; ln(P me the whole (2-step) procedure becomes representation independent. Since we h a ve no xed measure or prior over X , t h e c hoice of X as our basic sample space is essentially arbitrary. Therefore our procedure for selecting measures should give the same result for every alternative c hoice of sample space in which both the constraint E P ] = t and the guess E P Y jZ] c a n b e expressed. Our previous analysis suggests a novel way of guessing M 0 which i n m a n y cases achieves this. It is based on the idea that the`observables' in our problem are really the outcomes in and not the outcomes in X . This suggests postulating a uniform measure U over rather than X . If we then restrict the functions about which w e m a k e guesses to those that are determined by , the arbitrary choice of our basic representation space X becomes irrelevant and we are guaranteed to make the same predictions independent of whatever X we choose. We now formalize this idea. When no underlying measure is given, a MaxEnt problem is determined by a triple ( X X C X ). Note that, compared to the treatment in Section 7, the measure M X is missing. A v alid representation shift of such a MaxEnt problem is a pair ( V W ) such that (1) V is an underlying space both for X and for W and (2), the random variable W V determines V (again, compare to the de nition of valid representation shift in Section 7). The representation shift leads to a new MaxEnt problem ( W W C W ) w h e r e C W is the set of distributions over W compatible to C X (compatibility with respect to underlying space V ). Let ( V W ) b e a n y v alid representation shift of the MaxEnt problem ( X X C X ). Let U be the uniform measure over . Let M 0 X be the class of all measures over X that are compatible with U , and let M 
FINAL REMARKS
Non-convex constraints A major goal for future work is to analyze the behavior of P me X in minimax terms for constraints that go beyond form (2). For inequality constraints (E (X)] t), adjusted versions of all our results still hold. For constraints such that C becomes non-convex, M a x E n t i s k n o wn to lead to rather strange results. Interestingly, for such constraints, Theorem 1 does not apply and the minimax P me M is not equal any more to the traditional maximin P me M . We suspect that the minimax version gives preferable results in such cases. Consider for example disjunctive constraints (Grove et al., 1994) : let X = f0 1g, M uniform, and let the constraint be P (X = 1) = 0:1] _ P (X = 1) = 0:95]. Then traditional MaxEnt gives P me M (X = 1) = 0:1 which seems a dangerous guess -if it is wrong, it will lead to very bad predictions. In contrast, minimax P me M gives P me M (X = 1) = 0:5 (one can show that it coincides with the traditional MaxEnt distribution over the convex hull of C) w h i c h { to us { seems more reasonable.
Related Work (Haussler, 1997) has given a related (but still essentially di erent) minimax result involving logarithmic regret rather than loss. (Halpern & Koller, 1995) note that MaxEnt can be made representation independent for a restricted class of representation shifts by restricting the class of priors M in a certain way, but they do not use this to distinguish between di erent uses (guesses of E P ] for di erent ) of the same P me M .
